Is Trump a Hamlet-like genius who hides sharp strategic skills behind a buffoonish facade? Or is he helped by something much smarter than him?
At the time of the invasion of Iraq, in 2003, a legend appeared that said that George W. Bush was influenced in his decision by some material on “peak oil” by ASPO (Association for the Study of Peak Oil). Of course, nobody will ever know what went on inside Bush’s mind, but I don’t see this interpretation as impossible.
At that time, the idea of peak oil was commonly discussed, and just as commonly vehemently rejected. But one thing is what people say, and one is what people do. The human mind is a mishmash of half-baked ideas, and as Daniel Dennett said, we are all meme-infested apes. So, the “peak oil” meme may have played an important role in deciding the invasion of Iraq, and we all know the results. Enormous costs, the death of large numbers of people, and no evident return in terms of controlling the Middle Eastern oil resources.
Even worse was the case of Afghanistan. Twenty years of war, at least two trillion dollars spent, plus hundreds of thousands of casualties. In a previous post, I argued that the Afghan campaign was the result of the incompetence of US government officials who misunderstood the results of a geological survey of the Caspian oil resources. That originated another memetic infection in the form of the legend of the enormous oil reserves of the “New Saudi Arabia.” A legend comparable to that of the land of “Prester John” at the time of the Crusades. These fabled oil reserves could be reached by land only by taking control of Afghanistan, and that implied an enormously expensive land operation that led to nothing, when it was understood that those reserves simply didn’t exist. Consider also the case of the Russian Operation in Ukraine; there, too, military planners don’t seem to have been able to do much better.
Human history is dotted with gigantic strategic blunders that lead to military, economic, and social disasters. Aurelien describes strategic decision makers in no uncertain terms:
“Western politics is essentially a gigantic echo-chamber on the subject. Everyone who briefs you, everyone who attends the meetings you attend, everybody who briefs them, everybody you meet at receptions and in the margins of meetings, has basically the same opinions. Your colleagues in other governments, the Opposition spokesman on your subject, the Parliamentary Committee, the Secretary-General of NATO, the journalists who interview you, the EU Commission, think-tanks and influential retired politicians, will all be saying much the same thing. What we have here is quite close to a collective fantasy, a collective hallucination, or a process by which people collectively hypnotise each other. It’s groupthink on an epic scale.”
Personally, I have never been involved in strategic military planning, but I recognize Aurelien’s words as perfectly describing the way governments work at the levels I have direct experience with. Governmental decisions are mainly driven by incompetence coupled with groupthink, pushed by lobbies. The potential for enormous blunders is clear, and we saw plenty of them in recent history, at all levels.
Yet, something may have changed with the operation against Iran. It was nothing like the extravagantly expensive adventures of the US in Iraq and Afghanistan. It was a brief and ruthless operation, not accompanied by the usual, massive “consensus-building” campaign designed to demonize the enemy. The public opinion, largely unfavorable to the war, was simply ignored, just as the international law. The Iranians limited themselves to a small and ineffective retaliation. To understand how the Iranian Government could have reasoned, you can read this article by Chuck Pezeshky (key sentence: “Iran is a western venue, and people like their creature comforts.”). Wars are, in the end, a form of communication; brutal as much as you like, but that’s what they are. And, in this case, the two sides communicated to each other that neither wanted to go all the way through.
War is always madness, but, in this case, it appears that there was some method in it. Which mind was at work behind the scenes? Is Trump a Hamlet-like genius who hides sharp strategic skills behind a buffoonish facade? Nobody can say, but my impression is that he is smart, yes, but a genius, no. So, what caused the change in the behavior of the US military machine?
I think it is possible to propose an answer: Artificial Intelligence.
You know that AI has made impressive strides since the introduction of ChatGPT in 2022, and now chatbots and AI agents are embedded in all sectors of human decision-making operations. We know that they are used at the tactical level, for instance, to operate drones. But it is likely, almost certain, that they are also used at the strategic level. Just like in the case of peak oil, people won’t say what memes are floating in people’s minds, but it is certain that many are affected by AIs, and some may be defined as addicted.
Of course, I can’t know what role AI has in the current strategic decisions. Asking the chatbots themselves wouldn’t work. So, I thought of a test. What could have happened if AI had been available when the major blunders in Iraq and Afghanistan were made? So, I asked Grok 3 and ChatGPT how they would have advised the American Government about invading Afghanistan on the basis of the data available at the time. AI bots can do something that we humans can’t even dream of being able to do: carry out an analysis of the past without being affected by emotional or political factors.
Both Grok and ChatGPT said that, if they had existed in 2001, they would not have recommended to invade Afghanistan. They both understood that the perception of the “immense oil resources” of the Caspian Region was much exaggerated, even on the basis of the data available at the time. They weren’t affected by groupthink, nor they had to show off, or gain power points in the group. Their suggestion was simply based on an analysis of the available data. Not that they were peaceniks; they did suggest targeted bombing on Al Qaeda positions. But note how, if AIs gave the same advice to the US government for Iran, then we can understand why the operation was limited to a bombing strike.
Of course, I understand that I am just proposing a hypothesis, and I have no way to know how deeply embedded AI is in the decision process of the US government. And, of course, I know that AI chatbots can be “tweaked” to provide the answers that users want. But, on the whole, I believe that we are facing a positive development that can change many things in the future.
And we ain’t seen nothing yet. The “DOGE” thing was a fleeting moment, but it was a remarkable innovation in government management. We are going to see many things change in the future. For good or for bad? As usual, we march into the future without a map.
I've been doing a deep dive on fossil fuels and suggest you revisit. Indeed, I started a site, "DepletionCurve" based on that AND one of your essays (don't remember which).
My 2-cents is Bush, coming from Texas, did factor in peak oil. But it was more than that. If the U.S. didn't (and doesn't) control the Middle East Asia would have to. The Chinese was beginning a military buildup at the time which has come to fruition today. Recently, the rumor is they sent the latest in AD to Iran. They already have a military base in Djibouti, etc.
There's a lot going on there beyond the public eye. I agree with you AI is part of it. Especially if we include JADC2 (Joint All-Domain Command and Control) which has been in development for a while with F-35s, etc.
The truth is, if deep sea drilling technology did not develop. If the fields weren't exploited in Alaska, if fracking tech wasn't perfected after 2008 peak oil would have been felt. I believe we are again at peak oil. Indeed, I believe it is behind the Seneca Curve you write about (downward slope)
Bush saw what you saw. His timing was off. No one gets the timing right. Anyway, I don't believe Iraq turned out badly in that perspective (though I disagree with it). Well, I could go on and on. My main point when do YOU believe peak oil will happen (or has happened). I think it very important everyone have an opinion. Mine is around 2018. It's complicated, of course.
Interesting. Three years ago, I wondered why the covid things had suddenly stopped. “They” had won and could easily go further. But something stopped them. What was it? Maybe there's a similar explanation?
So I Asked Chagpt to comment the vaccine pass and this is relevant:
"When governments around the world introduced vaccine passports during the COVID-19 pandemic, these measures were presented as tools of public health. Yet their broader political implications were profound. In countries like France, the vaccine pass (or health pass) was not merely a temporary measure — it marked a significant shift in the relationship between the State, individual freedoms, and democratic functioning.
This article offers a critical analysis of the democratic consequences of such policies, beyond their epidemiological goals.
1. Governing by Exception: A Dangerous Shift
The rollout of the vaccine pass coincided with a broad expansion of executive power. Parliaments were often bypassed through the use of decrees and emergency powers, and prolonged states of exception became normalized.
In France, for instance, key decisions affecting daily freedoms — movement, work, access to public spaces — were made centrally and rapidly, with limited debate or consultation.
A democracy that indefinitely suspends its normal procedures risks hollowing itself from within.
2. Coerced Consent: Undermining Free Will
While the vaccine was not formally mandatory, the pass effectively conditioned access to essential aspects of life — from employment to education to basic leisure — on vaccination status.
This approach sidestepped the principle of free and informed consent, a foundational ethic in both medical practice and democratic life. By pressuring rather than persuading, the State blurred the line between health policy and social coercion.
Consent loses its meaning when refusal leads to exclusion from society.
3. Institutionalizing Division: A Fractured Social Body
The pass system created a two-tier society: the vaccinated, allowed full participation in public life, and the unvaccinated, often stigmatized as dangerous, irresponsible, or irrational.
Protests against the measure were widespread, yet often portrayed as fringe, unworthy of serious political engagement. Such an approach undermines the democratic norm of pluralism, in which dissent — even if unpopular — must be heard and respected.
Democracy is not simply the rule of the majority, but the protection of minorities — including dissenters.
4. Restricting Freedoms Without Clear Limits
The measures linked to the pass were frequently inconsistent or ambiguous, subject to rapid change and poor communication. Their proportionality — the principle that any restriction on freedom must be strictly necessary and limited — was not always convincingly demonstrated.
Oversight by courts and watchdog institutions was limited or delayed, leaving key democratic safeguards weakened.
Freedoms eroded in times of crisis may not easily be restored once the emergency fades.
5. The Rise of Technocratic Governance
Pandemic decision-making was heavily driven by scientific experts and centralized authorities, often without transparent dialogue with citizens or grassroots actors. Mayors, community health workers, and civil society organizations were rarely part of the process, despite their frontline role.
This trend toward technocratic governance sidelines the deliberative processes that give democracy its meaning.
Expertise is essential — but it cannot replace legitimacy derived from open democratic debate.
6. The Precedent Problem: Normalizing the Exceptional
By using emergency powers to restructure public life so deeply, the State set a dangerous precedent. Future crises — whether ecological, economic, or security-related — may be met with similarly sweeping, top-down responses, bypassing deliberative processes.
Without clear limitations, the “exception” risks becoming the norm.
If democracy can be indefinitely suspended for a crisis, we must ask: is it truly resilient, or merely conditional?
Conclusion: Democracy on Trial
The vaccine pass was not just a health measure — it became a stress test for democratic institutions. It revealed how quickly liberal democracies might accept restrictions on freedom, suppress dissent, and sideline deliberation in the name of safety and efficiency.
This period demands not only a medical or legal postmortem, but a democratic reckoning. We must ask ourselves:
How do we protect public health without abandoning democratic norms?
What limits should emergency powers face in a democratic state?
And how do we ensure that consent, pluralism, and accountability remain central in times of crisis?
If we fail to confront these questions, the real legacy of the vaccine pass may not be health protection — but a lasting erosion of democratic life.