How Close are we to a Nuclear Armageddon?

Lessons from the Forgotten Korean War

History never exactly repeats itself, but it often rhymes, and sometimes it does that in closely matched stanzas. The current risk of a nuclear exchange between NATO and Russia in Europe rhymes very well with a mostly forgotten war (at least in the West), the Korean War of 1950-1953. Here, I’ll try to sketch how the world was close to a nuclear holocaust in 1951, just as it is close now, and what we can learn from that old war.

Within some limits, the destiny of empires and civilizations is predictable. They grow on the resources they exploit, and they fall when these resources are depleted. The result is a cycle that often takes the shape of the “Seneca Curve” (Growth is slow, but ruin is rapid).

Resource wars are part of the cycle, but they are much more difficult to predict. They tend to appear all as the result of small perturbations that then grow out of control. You surely remember the bullet that killed Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914. It generated a series of events that led to four years of war and tens of millions of victims. It didn’t have to happen, but if it happened, it had reasons to happen. And if these reasons were to become valid again, a new, similar war could start.

What can we say about the war in Ukraine? It is part of the long cycle of Western Civilization, which is now starting a path of decline but can still amass sufficient resources to start a major conflict. Like most wars, it didn’t have to happen, but if it happened, it had reasons to happen. Unlike previous wars, it involves nuclear-armed powers facing each other. Is it going to evolve into a full nuclear exchange? The best we can do to evaluate the risk is to search for similar historical examples.

There has never been a war in which two comparable powers used nuclear weapons against each other. But, in one case, the world went very close to that: the Korean War, from 1950 to 1953. We nearly forgot about this old war, probably because it didn’t end in a victory for the West. But it is remembered very well in China and North Korea. It can still teach us several lessons.

All wars start because someone makes a mistake, typically misunderstanding an adversary's intentions. The Korean War was not an exception, and huge mistakes were made on both sides. The North Koreans thought that by invading South Korea, they were not invading a foreign country but reunifying their nation. The Soviets thought the Americans would not interfere, and the Americans reacted without understanding how important Korea was to China. The result was a major war: the casualties ran in the few millions, both among civilians and military personnel. The destruction by aerial bombing of practically all North Korean cities was a disaster of historical proportions.

The events that rhyme most with our current situation are those that took place in 1951. The North Koreans had almost completely defeated the South Korean forces when the US, supported by other UN countries, intervened and pushed back the North Koreans almost all the way to the Chinese border. At this point, China crossed the Korean border with a large land force, defeating the UN forces and retaking a large part of Korea. In this situation, General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the US forces, proposed dropping between 30 and 50 atomic bombs on North Korea and China. The main idea was to cut the supply lines of the Chinese army by destroying the infrastructure that connected China to Korea. Radioactivity would make the whole border impassable for years and perhaps decades.

You probably never heard of this proposed nuclear attack, but can you imagine what could have happened if it had been carried out? The world would have been catapulted into a condition in which nuclear bombs were not just a deterrent, but tactical weapons to be used whenever a military commander thought they were needed. How would China and the Soviet Union react after seeing that the US had turned a large swat of land into a radioactive desert? Could they retaliate in kind?

At the time of the Korean War, the Chinese had no nuclear weapons, but the Soviets did, having detonated their first one in 1949. In 1951, they demonstrated that they also had the capability of delivering nuclear warheads by heavy bombers. The Americans probably had an advantage in terms of the number of warheads available, but each side had the capability of nuking the other.

At this point, the road to Armageddon was open. We can amuse ourselves by thinking of various possible apocalyptic scenarios, including the war between the two blocks expanding to Western Europe, with nuclear weapons used there, too. The phrase "a tactical nuclear weapon is one that explodes in Germany" is attributed to Helmut Schmidt, former Chancellor of West Germany. It conveys the idea of the situation. The “Cold War” could have become hot. Very hot.

Fortunately, no nuclear warheads were dropped on North Korea or China. In April 1951, President Harry Truman denied MacArthur’s request and dismissed him. The war continued for two more years, ending with an armistice. The idea that a nuclear war could be won was gradually abandoned, and the confrontation between the two world blocks froze into the “Cold War.” In 1953, President Eisenhower, who had replaced Truman, gave a speech titled “Atoms for Peace” at the UN General Assembly. It was a strong statement that the US was not considering its nuclear capabilities as a weapon for world domination. A miracle, perhaps, but it happened.

Now, let’s examine the current situation in light of the Korean War. The analogies are impressive. Russia plays the role of North Korea, having invaded a region considered part of the Russian nation. Ukraine plays the role of South Korea, fighting to maintain its status as an independent state. NATO plays the role of the US (more exactly, the UN) in supporting Ukraine. China plays the role of the Soviet Union, supporting Russia but without directly participating in the conflict. Another similarity is the belligerent mood of the Western public. During the Korean War, there was never a public opposition to the war comparable to that against the Vietnam War, nearly 20 years later. Today, the situation is similar: there certainly exists public opposition to the war in Ukraine in the West, but it is not part of the allowed opinions and doesn’t normally appear in the media.

There are, of course, differences. The nuclear capabilities of the two sides are more balanced today than in 1951. The equivalent of Douglas MacArthur, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, has not publicly advocated a nuclear strike against Russia. However, it is no mystery that the possibility of an attack on Russia is being quietly discussed in NATO military circles. Then, the US committed about 300,000 troops to the Korean War, while American soldiers are not fighting in Ukraine today (at least officially). Overall, though, the similarities remain important.

What saved us at the time of the Korean War? Could the same factors save us again? It is remarkable that the decision not to use nuclear weapons in Korea was made by a single person, Harry Truman. Even more remarkably, Truman was the same president who had authorized the extermination of hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians by nuclear weapons in 1945. Maybe Truman regretted his earlier decision? Perhaps he didn’t want to be remembered in history as the president who had started a nuclear Armageddon? Was he cautious or skeptical about the results of the operation? (*) Or, simply, Truman had quarreled with MacArthur, and for this reason he decided to nix his request? We will never know. In history, some things happen, and some don’t. And nobody knows for sure why.

How about our times? Unlike the situation in 1951, with Truman at the helm, today the US does not seem to have a functioning mind at the top of the political and military hierarchy. The result is that not only we don’t have any possibility of influencing the decisions being made, but we don’t even know who is making them, on the basis of which authority, and for what reason. We can only sit and watch while malevolent powers make decisions that might kill us all. Maybe we need another miracle? I don’t know, but I suggest that praying to whatever divinity you worship might help.

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(*) It is possible that Truman and his advisors understood the risk of failure of the attack against North Korea. At the time, nuclear weapons had never been used as tactical weapons, and their reliability was far from being established. In addition, 1950 had been a horrible year for the US bomber fleet, with as many as five major crashes of US bombers carrying nuclear warheads. Fortunately, none generated a nuclear explosion, but it was a bad omen for the complex and difficult task of delivering the bombs over a well-defended, hostile territory. Then, the US bombers carrying nuclear bombs would have faced the Mig-15, a Soviet fighter plane that — at the time — was superior to anything that the Americans could oppose. On a single night, on the “Black Tuesday” on October 14th, 1951, Soviet sources claimed that the Mig-15s had downed 10 B-29 bombers. The American side admitted only three lost planes and a damaged one. But it is a fact that after that day, the US forces never ventured again in daytime bombing raids on North Korea. That posed enormous problems to a nuclear bombing campaign. So, maybe it was fear of the Mig-15 that saved the world from nuclear holocaust. If that’s the case, it shows that the people at the top have no moral restraints and understand only force. But that we already knew.